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Introduction: The European Scene after the First World War
After the devastation of World War I, most of Europe lay in ruin. 
The map of Europe had been redrawn—new States were born, old empires 
were gone, and somé losing countries survived bút at the great cost of 
territories detached. As the months passed, it was clear that somé 
rehabilitation would be needed. Mainly with Great Britain in the lead, 
Europe tried to pút its house in order. The banks and Financial houses of 
London were the only Financial institutions in Europe with the 
organization, power and resources to fináncé the búik of the European 
reconstruction, and so with Great Britain in the lead, Europe tried to pút 
its house in order.
There was another reason, however, as to why Great Britain had to 
take on the leading role in European reconstruction. America, after 
somewhat reluctantly joining the war in 1917, was on the verge of 
becoming a major force on the European Continent. However, Woodrow 
Wilson’s dream of a postwar International organization to guard over the 
peace came intő being without the United States. The US Senate voted 
against such an intemational commitment both as a political revenge fór
1 This is a much-revised and largely expanded version of a presentation that took piacé 
in “New Concepts and Approaches in English and American Studies” PhD 
Conference, Eötvös Loránd University, November 13, 2008.
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Wilson’s nőt including any prominent Republican at the Peace 
Conference, and reflecting the generál sentiment of isolationism in the 
country. Thus the League of Nations, formally established on January 10, 
1920, was starting from a disadvantageous position in terms of world 
wide influence, power, credibility, and sufficiency. Moreover, Germany 
and the Soviet Union, two countries that would have somewhat countered 
the fallout from the United States lack of involvement and lent credibility 
to the organization were alsó absent from the League of Nations 
formation, with Germany nőt becoming a member in 1926 and the Soviet 
Union notuntil 1934.
The lack of American participation did nőt exclude the possibility 
of US contribution to financial affairs in Post-War Europe. The 
subsequent American Republican governments, however, made such a 
course much more difficult. When European reconstruction became an 
issue in which American participation was sought, the main difficulty lay 
in the fact that such initiatives emanated form the League of Nations. 
Since the United States was nőt a member, the large American financial 
firms, the most prominent being J. P. Morgan & Co., were extremely 
careful injoining deals, even if profits were luring. In addition to political 
differences, the relations between the Allied Powers and the United States 
were heavily burdened with debt questions and issues of reparations. The 
Europeans, especially the French, wanted to squeeze reparations out of 
the loser States, mainly from Germany, and they thought to repay the 
American creditors from this sum, a course the United States could nőt 
accept. It seemed that until this problem was solved, there could be no 
lasting cooperation between the two sides.
Since there was no hope fór official support, the League had to 
count on priváté collaboration with Americans. In addition to bankers, 
American priváté citizens were working with the League of Nations, in 
various capacities, bút always in an unofficial capacity, since the United 
States government tried to avoid every official contact with the League. 
So, when the Financial reconstructions of European countries came to the 
forefront, the League of Nations hoped to secure both American bankers 
fór their money and American priváté citizens fór their work in the 
schemes, a concept that was to strengthen both halves of such a vision. 
The remainder of this paper will look at two compelling examples of this 
concept in Austria and Hungary, and what the ramifications of 
reconstruction were fór these countries.
466
Part I: Austria
Austria, the remnant of the once powerful Habsburg Empire, found 
itself under devastating circumstances in the wake of the First World 
War. The territory of the country became a fraction of what it had been 
and it meant the loss of agricultural products, raw materials, and finished 
products, since most of these had been produced in its rural areas, now 
new and independent States understandably on unfriendly terms with 
Austria. In the Capital, where lack of food caused starvation, a 
concentrated population of about two millión tried to make ends meet. 
With a large population bút insufficient resources, the once happy Capital 
reflected a gloomy picture. The political landscape was nőt promising 
either. On November 12, 1918, a republic was declared and Austria 
showed political polarization that was to be the norm fór the next 15 
years. In the country the Christian Democrats enjoyed a majority, whereas 
in Vienna, the political left ruled. The country had to accept the Treaty of 
Saint-Germain-en-Laye, which was signed on September 10, 1919. As in 
the case of Germany, the Treaty contained the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, of which Austria was nőt yet a member.2 *Article 88 forbade 
Austria from trying to jóin Germany, without referring to the country by 
name, while the economic and Financial clauses were similar to the 
Germán peace treaty. As a consequence, Austria was liable to pay 
reparation fór loss and damages done during the war. The amount of the 
sum to be paid was to be determined by the Reparation Commission and 
payments were to start after May 1, 1921, and continue fór the next thirty 
years. Both from political and economic points of view, Austria faced an 
unhappy period.
Indeed, fór somé time Austria could nőt survive on its own. The 
first three years after the armistice was characterized by international 
charity in the form of food and public loans. The major powers provided 
about $100 millión to which the British contributed $45 millión and the 
Americans $24 millión. The United States, Great Britain, Francé, and
2
This clause was the reason why the United States did nőt ratiíy the Treaty, just like in 
the case of Germany, and a separate peace treaty was signed between the two countries
on August 24, 1921.
League of Nations, The Financial Reconstruction o f Austria. General Survey and 
Principal Documents (Geneva, 1926), 11; The Austrian Chargé (Prochnik) to Hughes, 
February 23, 1922, FRUS, 1922, Vol. 1, 615-6.
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Italy paid an American loan of $48 millión in equal parts.4 Besides 
official help, priváté charity alsó provided millions, and the United States 
took the lion’s share in this sphere as well. These measures, however, 
proved inadequate to alleviate the mounting troubles. The economy came 
to a virtual standstill and there was rampant inflation. The League of 
Nations, the prominent representative of the “New Europe,” could nőt let 
Austria pass intő social upheaval. Economic instability, with a worthless 
currency,5 it was feared, would lead to revolution. With such 
apprehensions in mind, the British leadership, set intő mohon to solve the 
Austrian problem through the League.
Despite British efforts and the terrible circumstances in Vienna, it 
took a long time before the League turnéd its attention toward Austria in 
earnest. The Austrian government officially pleaded to the League fór 
help on August 23, 1922.6 The powers showed lukewarm interest and it 
was only due to a British request that the Austrian question was pút on the 
agenda at the next session of the Council.7 *On September 6, Austrian 
Chancellor Ignaz Seipel appeared in front of the League Council, and 
officially declared that Austria would accept control in exchange fór help, 
bút at the same time he alsó used the ongoing political and economico
situation in his country as blackmail. The Austrian situation was in fact 
infused with the possibility of social disturbance. As a result, the rest of 
the defining actors on the European landscape had no choice bút to follow 
the British lead in order to reach a solution. Furthermore, the prestige of 
the League was on the line: if it failed in its very first undertaking, what 
would the future hold?
Upon the recommendations of the Financial Committee, on October 
4, 1922, three Protocols were signed by Great Britain, Francé, Italy, 
Czechoslovakia, and Austria: in the first mutual assurance of political
4
Jusserand to Lansing, February 20, 1920, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of 
the United States (subsequently FRUS), 1920, Vol. 1, 260.
5 Clerks in Vienna tended to use the back of crown notes as scribbling paper, simply 
because it was the cheapest paper available. (Sir Arthur Salter, Memoirs o f  a Public 
Servant (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), 175).
6 Seipel to the League Council, August 23, 1922, C12652/74/3 FO/371/7340, The 
National Archives of Great Britain (subsequently TNA).
7 British Cabinet to the Secretary-General, August 25, 1922, Ibid., C12838/74/3.g
League of Nations, The League o f Nations Reconstruction Schemes in the Inter-War 
Period (Geneva, 1944), 29.
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independence and territorial integrity was given to and by Austria; the 
second stated the conditions of the guarantee of the loan nőt exceeding 
650 millión gold crowns; the third was about Austria’s obligation and the 
functions of the Commissioner-General, a person working in Vienna as an 
agent of the League and controlling the loan proceeds and the 
reconstruction.9 A Bank of Issue was alsó to be set up that was to be 
independent of the govemment with the sole authority to issue any 
money. These steps were to insure the árrést of the fali of the crown and 
stop the inflation. With the loan of 631 millión gold crowns, Austria was 
supposed to pút its financial situation in order by the end of 1924. Right 
after the signing of the Protocols, the search fór the would-be 
Commissioner-General started in earnest. Time was a crucial factor. A 
League delegation was to visit Vienna in the first days of November, and 
the League wanted by then to find a suitable person fór the position. As a 
starting point, he was nőt to represent any of the guaranteeing powers. 
Nor was he to come from any neighboring countries. These were sound 
political considerations, since such a case would have compromised the 
possible execution of the reconstruction scheme. The post-war relations in 
Central Europe were bittér. Austria was especially apprehensive of 
neighboring Italy and Czechoslovakia, two of the guarantor countries. 
Seipel was afraid that unless Great Britain, Francé, and the United States 
came to the rescue, Austria would be exploited by the Italians and the 
Czechs.10 Therefore a person was needed with impeccable credentials 
who represented an as economically, historically and politically, detached 
country as was possible. Austrians then would nőt feel sheer domination; 
it was enough to pút their country under League control.
At first a few American and Dutch names were bandied about as 
possible candidates fór the position, bút the search quickly settled on the 
American Roland William Boyden. He had been an unofficial delegate on 
the Reparation Committee since 1920, meaning that he had no right to 
vote, bút in effect, his ideas and opinions counted as much as that of the 
official delegates.11 He had already proved on that body that he well 
understood both British and French policies, and demonstrated the 
capacity fór conciliatory persuasion, thus he seemed to hold the qualities
9 League of Nations, Austria, 137-150.
10 Akers-Douglas to Curzon, September 15, 1922, C13183/74/3, FO371/7340, TNA.
11 He submitted his resignation to the State Department after Warren Harding ’s victory 
at the polls in 1920, bút it was nőt accepted and he worked on till 1923.
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needed from the political point of view. Aside from his being an 
American, he had “the required temperament and political aptitude fór 
this task.”12 *
In a politically divided country, the personal qualities of the 
League’s Commissioner might have meant the key to allaying the 
intensity of political controversy. Boyden’s personality alsó played to his 
favor. While Alfréd Zimmerman, the possible Dutch backup, was known 
to possess a “somewhat domineering character,” Norman believed that 
the American’s somewhat more amenable manner was the key factor in 
his strong appeal. When Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the 
League, broached the idea of securing Boyden as Commissioner-General 
to Lord Arthur Balfour, “the idea of appointing an American, intimately 
acquainted with the problems at issue, greatly appealed” to the latter.14 It 
is quite clear that, due to the political underpinnings, the first option was 
to recruit an American.
Boyden was willing to accept the job and wrote to the State 
Department and asked whether they had any objection to his holding such 
a position. A quick and short answer came giving the State Department’s 
consent, bút Boyden was slow in notifying the League, which caused 
significant problems fór the organization. The time factor was important, 
because until a new Commissioner-General was named, the chances were 
weak fór Austria to find provisional credits. Therefore, the whole scheme 
was in danger if no suitable person was found. That is why the League 
officials were so impatient to find out whether Boyden would accept it, 
and if he wouldn’t, they wanted to waste no time in securing their backup 
choice, Alfréd Zimmerman. “If Boyden tums it down, don’t waste more 
time, bút take Z. and be thankful,” was Blackett’s suggestion, simply fór 
fear that they might run out of time.15 The situation in Vienna was far 
from reassuring and in the first days of November the situation became 
critical. Thus Boyden’s acceptance became urgent fór the League of
12 Sir Arthur Salter, Personality in Politics (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), 164;
Salter, Memoirs, 179. ír Mariing to FO, February 22, 1922, C2679/74/3, F0371/7336, TNA; Norman to
Strong, October 24, 1922, 2A 165/1, Bank of England Archives (subsequently BoE).
14 Monnet to Hankey, November 2, 1922, Appointment of a Commissioner General fór 
Austria. Doc. No. 24510, R. 519, League of Nations Archives (subsequently LNA).
15 Blackett to Salter, October 23, 1922, 79/13/1, Box No. 3. Austria, S. 99. Nixon 
Papers, LNA.
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Nations. They were already preparing to propose Zimmerman in case 
Boyden refused.16 The young world organization rightfully thought that 
its prestige was at stake. With every single day, nőt only the situation of 
Austria was deteriorating, bút the intemational status of the League was 
weakening. If it was impotent to launch a reconstruction scheme in a tiny 
Central European State, how would it cope with much more ambitious 
plans on the world stage? Alsó, the securing of an American fór the job 
would have meant somé kind of cooperation between the League and the 
United States, if it was of the most informál natúré.
The US State Department, however, did nőt come to the rescue. It 
seemed to have misunderstood the message of Boyden concerning the 
Austrian position, and in a later telegram asked him nőt to accept it.17 18
What really happened was a fatal twist of history. Someone in the State 
Department saw the first, consenting message and found it too curt in 
light of the service Boyden had given his country. So, in another 
telegram, they expressed their reluctance at losing Boyden to another 
post. It was nőt meant to prevent him from taking the new post, bút hei o
interpreted it that way. This was found out only years later, which must 
have been small compensation. Afterwards, League officials had no other 
choice bút to move forward with Zimmerman.
Since there was nőt much time left and Zimmerman seemed to 
possess the technical qualities needed fór the execution of the job, the 
League started serious negotiations with him. In Arthur Salter’s words, he 
regarded “opposition to Socialism as a kind of crusade,” and he was 
“unsuited fór a task of political conciliation.”19 20Bút to a large degree, it 
was his experiences with Socialists in Rotterdam, where he had been 
Burgomaster, that made Zimmerman seem so likely a candidate. All in 
all, with Boyden out, the League was satisfied with the Dutchman. The
members of the Austrian sub-committee accepted Zimmerman and an
20official invitation was sent out duly.
Zimmerman gave up his home position with regrets and was 
somewhat reluctant to fill the offered position. He was simply nőt
16 Monnet and Salterto Balfour, November 5, 1922, C15137/74/3, F0371/7343, TNA.
17 Boyden to Monnet and Salter, November 8, 1922, No. 3. Austria, S. 106. Salter 
Papers, LNA.
18 Salter, Personality, 167.
19 Salter, Personality, 166; Salter,Memoirs, 180.
20 Drummond to Tufton, November 20, 1922, C15903/74/3, F0371/7343, TNA.
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enthusiastic about the job and always came up with certain requirements 
to create easier circumstances fór himself once in Vienna. He made a 
demand of six months preliminary appointment with indemnity payable if 
fór any reason he lost the job, a situation nőt comforting to the League.21 2345
Moreover, he was nőt keen to take part in a venture that might fail. He 
was nőt satisfied with £ 6,000 a month fór expenses either and wanted 
somé increase, next to the £ 1,000 indemnity in case his duties would be 
terminated. While he was granted £6,500 finally, it is interesting to note 
that Boyden would have been satisfied with £2,000 a month. The League 
simply could nőt delay the issue fór lack of time; they needed a mán fór the 
post, whatever the demands. The League accepted Zimmerman’s 
conditions, as they ultimately caused no significant changes to the overall 
scheme and so on December 15, 1922, the new Commissioner-General
24began his post in Vienna.
Despite the fact that at last the League of Nations secured a 
Commissioner-General, the problems of the Austrian reconstructions 
were far from over. Bonds were secured on the revenues of the Customs 
and Tobacco Monopoly as a guarantee fór the issues in the four guarantor 
countries each undertaking to guarantee 20%. In November inflation 
was stopped. According to the League scheme, 100,000 officials were to 
be dismissed until July 1, 1924, in order to reduce the govemment’s 
widespread bureaucracy to a more acceptable level.26 In early December 
both the Reconstruction Law and the Geneva Protocols were ratified by a 
majority vote in the Austrian Parliament. During November and
21 Drummond to Niemeyer, November 30, 1922, and Drummond and Monnet to Salter, 
December 8, 1922, 2/4/1, No. 6. Austria, S. 109. Salter Papers, LNA.
22 Drummond to Tufton, November 17, 1922, F. 2073/021/3. Austrian Reconstruction,
T160/584, TNA.
23 Commissioner-General: Note as to Action. 2/4/1, No. 6. Austria, S. 109. Salter Papers.
LNA.
24 Drummond to Zimmerman, December 10, 1922, No. 3. Austria, S. 106. Salter Papers.
LNA.
25 In the summer of 1923, the long-term loan was guaranteed as follows: Great Britain, 
Francé, and Czechoslovakia 24.5% each, Italy 20.5%, Belgium and Sweden 2% each, 
Denmark and the Netherlands 1% each. (League of Nations, Schemes, 31.)
26 This number was nőt delivered by Austria. Although between October 1922 and 
March 1923, the number of State officials discharged was 65,000, until June 30, 1926, 
altogether 96,382 officials were dismissed. (Rothschild, Austria’s Economic 
Development, 50; League of Nations, The Financial Reconstruction o f Austria, 87.)
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December unemployment doubled from 58,000 to 117,000. Although 
the Commissioner-General was chosen, the soon-to-open National Bank 
had no president. Following somé debate between Austria and the 
guarantor States, former Minister of Fináncé Richard Reisch was 
nominated to the post with the condition that a foreign adviser would be 
attached with large powers. After securing a short-term loan in the 
amount of £3,500,000 in February, 1923, the focus shifted to the more
29monumental task of securing a long-term loan.
It was important from the political point of view that priváté 
American Capital be involved. Already in April, 1923, the League saw in 
an American participation a possible “precedent involving far-reaching 
consequences,” even if the money raised in the United States was a small 
one. Montagu Norman was asked to try to lay the groundwork in 
America fór the Austrian loan, bút J. P. Morgan & Co. signaled that at 
present there was no chance of issuing an Austrian loan in the US. This 
was despite the fact that the Reparation Commission decision on February 
20 suspended the liens fór reparation charges on any revenues pledged as 
security on the loan fór twenty years, and the US Congress in a Joint 
Resolution on March 16, 1922, postponed the relief credits fór twenty 
years.27 89*312 3The American government gave first priority to the British debt 
settlement. In April Norman got further information from a New York 
banker that the loan in its present form had nőt much chance in the United 
States. In spite of such unfavorable news, Norman now used all his 
powers to ensure the success of the loan to Austria. He reassured a 
worrying Zimmerman that despite the great financial and political 
problems, he was doing everything possible.34 His efforts might have 
been in vain bút help came from J. P. Morgan in the end. Contrary to his
27
27 League of 'Naíions, Austria, 36.
28 Onthe debate see Keelingto Curzon, December 21, 1922, C17515/74/3, F0371/7344, 
TNA; Foreign Office to Keeling, December 22, 1922, Ibid., C17537/74/3; Keeling to
Curzon, December 21, 1922, Ibid., C17603/74/3.
29 League of Nations, Ansina, 38-9. 
ro De Bordes’ memorandum, April 27, 1923, 4-8c, C. 6, LNA.
31 Strakosch to Norman, December 30, 1922, and J. P. Morgan to Morgan, Grenfell &
Co., January 17, 1923, OV28/54, BoE.
32 Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 3997, March 16, 1922.
33 Norman to Bark, April 25, 1923, G3/179, BoE.
34 Norman to Zimmerman, May 16, 1923, Ibid..
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earlier views, J. P. Morgan had decided to take up the Austrian case. This 
was despite the efforts of the banking house to secure American 
governmental assistance in the loan. In May, Thomas Lamont came 
over to Europe to deal with a tranche to be floated later in New York. The 
sheer weight of his presence meant that now the scheme had a realistic 
chance of becoming a reality.
To help convince American bankers and to garner public support, 
Lamont eased the path fór Zimmerman, who made a speech on June 4 in 
London to a group of American press people with the aim of advertising 
the Austrian reconstruction with the hope that the American tranche of the 
long-term loan would be realized. Norman did the lion’s share of doing 
the background work. He had almost daily conversations with Lamont, 
and gave an interview to American reporters, despite the fact that he 
avoided publicity as much as he could.35 6 3789The effort paid off and the 
London issue was made on June 11, and the American tranche was 
launched on the same day. By 10:15, ten minutes after opening, the 
American subscription totaled five times the $25 millión the banks were 
committed to. Jack Morgan was surprised at the success and found the
38“oversubscription almost bewildering.”
Now that the two heavyweights had gone along, the rest was a 
formality. Throughout the summer the long-term loan of a net totál of 
611,000,000 gold crowns was floated in several countries. Great Britain 
stood out with subscribing more than 300,000,000 gold crowns 
(£14,000,000), while the United States’ share was about 123,000,000 gold 
crowns ($25,000,000). The American part was roughly equal to what 
had been missing in the spring. In this sense, American priváté Capital 
came to the rescue. In issuing an adequate British part the main figure 
was clearly Norman and Zimmerman expressed his gratitude fór his 
“brilliant leading of the action.”40 The remainder of the loan was provided 
by Belgium, Francé, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland,
35 Michael J. Hogan, Informál Entente (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1991), 65.
36 Norman’s Diary Entries, May 30, June 1, June 4, and June 8, 1923, ADM 34/12, BoE.
37 Michael J. Hogan, Informál Entente. The Priváté Structure o f  Cooperation in Anglo- 
American Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1991), 
66.
38 J. P. Morgan to Morgan, Grenfell & Co., June 11, 1923, OV28/56, BoE.
39 League of NationsMMs/r/ű', 41.
40 Zimmerman to Norman, June 11, 1923, 4-8h, C. 6, LNA.
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Czechoslovakia, Spain, and Austria. The price of issue was typically in 
the 76-8 % rangé, while the nominal rate of interest was 6%, in the 
United States it was 85.625% and 7% respectively.41 The numbers 
reflected well that the loan was nőt judged as a great investment. Still, 
what the League of Nations had set out to achieve was completed despite 
the many obstacles placed in its path. After all, the League made sure that 
a country in the heart of Europe would be helped collectively. Only a few 
years after the war, former enemy received the help it so badly needed.
Although the scheme got off to a promising start, the period of 
reconstruction was burdened with troubles throughout—often centering 
on the Commissioner. As a clear sign of overall Austrian antipathy to the 
System of control, Alfréd Zimmerman, who was reluctant to give in on 
any point that showed a departure from the original scheme, was a 
constant target of criticism. Only a few months after Zimmerman took up 
the post, the Socialists drew up a resolution that wanted to prevent the 
League Commissioner from carrying out priváté negotiations and getting 
any information from Austrians by labeling such an act High Treason 
against the State.42 The mohon died a quick death, bút the anti- 
Zimmerman sentiment remained. The average opinion was well summed 
up in the saying that “even the locomotives will whistle cheerfully when 
they carry Zimmerman back to Holland.”43 Therefore, when decontrol 
was within sight at last, the Austrians did nőt hide their joy. The sheer 
psychological value of regaining independence was enormous. It must be 
noted that the termination of Zimmerman’s office did nőt mean the 
absolute end of financial control. The Council had the right to reestablish 
control if the service of the loan was in danger, and the position of the 
bank adviser was renewed fór three more years. Zimmerman left Vienna 
on July 5, 1926. There was a farewell luncheon before his departure given 
by the President of the Confederation, and he got the Grand Cordon of the 
Decoration of Honor of the Republic fór his distinguished Services to 
Austria. On the official level, especially at the happy conclusion of 
affairs, Alfréd Zimmerman was a friend now. As Chancellor Ramek pút 
it, “You came to us as a stranger, now you leave us as a friend, as one of
41 League of Nations^Ms/r/'a, 41-2.
42 Keeling to Curzon, March 29, 1923, F. 2073/021/4. Austrian Reconstruction, 
T160/584, TNA.
The New York Times, December 10, 1925.42
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us. Austria will never forget you, our heartiest good wishes accompany
ii44you.
By any analysis, the Financial reconstruction of Austria was a 
success. In addition to the balancing of the budget and stabilizing the 
currency the two most conspicuous accomplishments, the standard of 
living of the working eláss became much higher than it was only a few 
years earlier and public health alsó showed a remarkable improvement. 
From all angles, the reconstruction period was very advantageous fór 
Austria. It escaped an absolute breakdown. The weak economic and 
Financial situation would have, in all likelihood, driven the country intő 
totál social chaos, and such an event might have meant outside 
interference. Great Britain, relying largely on its Financial background, its 
influence in the League of Nations, and its good relations with the United 
States, wanted an independent and functioning Austria in the heart of 
Europe, because they saw in it the possibility of achieving the grand 
vision of turning Central Europe intő a more or less working economic 
block that would provide peace, stability, and an economic outiét fór 
Great Britain and the whole of Europe. Partly to achieve such a long-term 
goal, Austria was only seen as an important start. Soon after that the 
Austrian reconstruction scheme was set intő motion, the attention turnéd 
toward the next country, Austria’s eastern neighbor, Hungary.
Part II: Hungary
Hungary was, in many ways, in a similar situation to Austria. 
Although as an agricultural country, it was a little bit better off in terms of 
supplying basic sustenance fór its people, bút politically it was much 
worse off. The short-lived bolshevist coup in 1919 deteriorated the 
situation of the country both politically and financially. The main political 
drawback of the communist rule in Hungary was manifest at the peace 
negotiations. The Peace Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, was a 
fatal blow to Hungary and sealed its fate fór along time to come. 
Although the country expected harsh terms and more or less accepted the 
new realities of Central Europe, Hungarians all the way through had 
hoped and believed that Wilsonian principles would prevail and territories 
with Hungárián majorities would nőt be lost. To the shock of the whole 4
44 Chilstonto Chamberlain, July 6, 1926, C7753/246/3, F0371/11213, TNA.
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nation, the treaty detached huge Hungárián ethnic blocs, which was due to 
nothing else bút serving the wishes of the neighboring Slavic countries. 
The territory of Hungary was reduced to one-third of its former territory, 
and the population decreased by about ten millión to a little less than eight 
millión. Parts VIII and IX of the Trianon Treaty dealt with reparation and 
financial matters. The text declared that Hungary would have to pay 
reparations fór a period of thirty years starting frorn May 1, 1921, 
although the sum was nőt specified.
Similarly to Austria and other Central and Eastern European 
countries, Hungary was provided with relief. In all likelihood due to the 
bolshevist takeover, the country got only a fraction of what Austria or the 
other recipient countries were given. While the whole region received 
relief of almost $500 millión, the sum given to Hungary was only $9.3 
millión.45 Nőt surprisingly, the main share of the relief was financed by 
the United States, 86% of the totál, while Great Britain provided 12%.46 478
When the issue of repatriation came to the főre, relief was alsó largely 
needed. About 13,000 mén were successfully brought back from the 
Soviet Union. The $1,200,000 needed fór the enterprise was alsó largely 
provided from American sources. American relief was nőt restricted to 
matériái questions only. In 1922, when the worst was over, the United 
American Lines Inc. decided to give 1 millión crowns to a Hungárián 
cultural institution. The Hungárián Historical Society was chosen as the 
beneficiary. With these outside efforts, Hungary slowly climbed back to 
its pre-war status, bút it was clear that without political consolidation the 
country would stand no chance of rehabilitation of any kind.
The reál change came with the István Bethlen becoming Hungary’s 
new Prime Minister on April 14, 1921. His political approach was very 
practical and realistic. As he pút it, “What I am saying and doing is the 
outcome of domestic and foreign policy necessities. My policy is shaped
45 M. C. Kaser and E. A. Radice, eds. The Economic History o f  Eastern Europe, 1919­
1975. Vol. 1. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 387.
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Magvető Kiadó, 1981), 40.
47 Grant-Smith to Hughes, December 10, 1921, 864.00/482, Roll 6, M. 708, National 
Archives and Records Administration (subsequently NARA).
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by the circumstances.”49 The American minister in Budapest described 
him as “the reál political pivot and barométer of political life.”50 After 
Bethlen became the prime minister of Hungary, the British minister in 
Budapest sent a report in which he wrote that all efforts must be made to 
help the consolidation of the country.51 52At the end of 1922, Hungary 
managed to become a member of the League of Nations, a step that would 
serve the country well. In becoming a member of the most important 
political body of the day, Hungary stepped out of the political isolation it 
had been subjected to since the end of the war, and the doors opened fór 
the chance at outside financial help. Fór such an aid, Hungary first and 
foremost wanted American and British help.
It was well known that within the League of Nations Great Britain 
and Francé vied fór leadership. On the whole, owing to both political and 
Financial Capital, the British had the bigger influence, so it was all too 
understandable fór Hungary to be attracted to Great Britain. In addition, 
Britain could nőt allow Hungary to “go under financially” if it wanted to 
achieve its Central European goal. On the other hand, Francé was the 
principal supporter of the Little Entente, the anti-Hungarian alliance of 
Czechoslovakia, Románia, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. 
Therefore, it was alsó a necessity fór Hungary to find a counterbalance 
and it knew that if there was one country on the continent that had sway 
over its antagonistic neighbors even more than Francé it was Great 
Britain. Naturally, Hungary was well aware of the fact that in the 
changing post-war world the most influential country was outside Europe, 
and so it was only logical that Hungary try to develop a relationship with 
the United States.
Hungary, being a member of the Central Powers during World War 
I, was automatically considered an enemy State of the United States, 
although the two nations held nothing against the other. After the 
armistice, the two countries tried to pút their relations on a normál footing 
in the hope of future cooperation. As was seen, charity was coming to the 
country from priváté American resources, bút affairs needed to be 
normalized on the diplomatic level as well. As a first step, trade and
49 Ignác Romsics, Bethlen István (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 1999), 188.
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communication were again authorized between the United States and 
Hungary beginning September 2, 1919, and shortly after, Ulysses Grant- 
Smith was appointed to be Commissioner to Hungary on December 4, 
1919.53 He was nőt accredited as a diplomatic representative since no 
peace treaty had been concluded between the two countries, bút his main 
task was nőt altered by this lack of formality as he was to do everything in 
his power to help a representative government to take root in Hungary.54 
This was important fór the United States after the bolshevist rule, which 
was seen upon as the new threat. The next phase between the relations of 
the two countries was characterized by the conclusion of a separate peace 
treaty.
Since the United State Senate refused to ratify the Paris Peace 
Treaty, America neither became part of the League of Nations, nor 
concluded peace treaties with its ex-enemies. The clear signal that the 
United States treated these countries as one group was evident in the fact 
that it concluded separate peace treaties with these States within a few 
days: on August 24, 1921, with Germany, on August 25, 1921, with 
Austria, and on August 29, 1921, with Hungary. The United States made 
clear that it was willing to talk with Hungary conceming peace only if it 
was based on a similar peace treaty with Germany.5 The American 
government basically blackmailed Hungary, coated in nice diplomatic 
terms, that acceptance of the terms agreed to by Germany was the 
condition necessary reestablishing diplomatic relations.56 Grant-Smith 
pointed out to the Hungarians “the advantages which would accrue to 
Hungary, both of political and economic natúré, by their acceptance of the 
stipulations of the Peace Resolution, and the subsequent negotiation of an 
agreement with the United States.”57 Hungary had no reál choice bút to 
accept what was offered
In normalizing the relations with the United States, Hungary tried to 
play on the friendly Anglo-Saxon card. Both from political and financial 
perspectives, the United States and Great Britain were the two countries
53 Notice Issued by the War Trade Board Section of the Department of State, September
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that Hungary could expect the most help from. One of the various 
Hungárián plans after the war advised that “Hungary should offer itself to 
America as a base fór its economic penetration intő Central and Eastem 
Europe.” This scheme, although nothing came of it, sized up well the 
American intentions regarding Europe after the war: the United States 
was to remain outside the political problems of Europe bút was interested 
in economic expansion. Obviously, Hungary needed to find help far from 
its geographical position, because its neighbors were its enemies, Francé 
was their quasi-ally, Germany was burdened with its own problems, 
Soviet Russia was an ideological enemy, and Italy had nőt shown yet its 
interest in Central Europe. This meant that only Great Britain and the 
United States remained; both were far enough away to be friendly and 
powerful enough to help.
With British prodding and Austria as an exemplar, Hungary asked 
fór help from the League of Nations on May 5, 1923. From this moment 
on a long political tug of war started between the British and the French 
inside the League. After many months of diplomatic negotiations a 
compromise was reached, and the Protocols fór a Hungárián loan under 
the aegis of the League were signed by all involved countries on March 
14, 1924. One remaining problem was that Hungary needed all the 
countries concerned to waive their priority of relief bonds in favor of the 
reconstruction. One of the most difficult partners in this question was the 
United States, which was willing only to do so if all the other countries 
concerned did the same, a line of policy mirroring the British one.58 9 
Finally, on April 25, 1924, the debt funding agreement was signed, and 
the US was willing to suspend priority charges over relief bonds fór the 
sake of a loan fór Hungary. By the end of May then, all countries had 
waived their priority on behalf of the reconstruction loan. Almost 
everything had been accomplished before the actual flotation of the loan. 
The remaining problem to be solved was to find the right person fór the 
position of the Commission-General to Hungary.
As was the case with Austria, the time factor was crucial in 
determining a new Commission-General, and the League wanted to find a 
suitable candidate as quickly as possible. As was alsó the case with 
Austria, after a few European names were considered fór the position, it
58 Ránki, Gazdaság, 20.
59 Niemeyer to FO, Januaiy 26, 1924, C1480/37/21, FO371/9904, TNA; Hughes to 
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was ultimately decided by the organization and Hungary that an 
American would be the preferred choice fór the post. It must nőt be 
forgottén that in the whole of Europe, the United States was possibly the 
only country that could safely count on friendly feelings and that could 
really boast of being a neutral, meaning it stayed away from the 
Continental bickering. In addition to the political goodwill of an 
American, the Bethlen government supposedly had information that the 
American money markét would be willing to participate only if an 
American were chosen fór the post.60 Alsó, Hungary wanted to avoid an 
Austria-like control, which they judged as far too restrictive and all- 
encompassing. Fór all of these reasons it was crucial that an American fill 
the post of Commissioner-General in Hungary.
In light of this belief, the Hungárián government had already started 
to make steps toward securing a prominent American Citizen. The 
reasoning was that if they managed to convince a high-standing American 
to accept the post, it would automatically create the needed confidence on 
the money markets. The United States had taken part in the Austrian 
reconstruction and it was no secret that the Americans were following the 
British example there. Thus if an American were named Commissioner, it 
seemed, the doors of the priváté American banks would open and the 
United States would play a large role in securing the loan. The target 
person was Warren P. Gould Harding, ex-Governor of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston. Harding was backed by other influential mén. 
The most well known of them was Colonel House, President Wilson’s 
one-time friend and advisor, who told Sir Eric Drummond, the General 
Secretary of the League, that he thought that Harding’s nomination would 
“be [the] best possible way of insuring American cooperation financially 
in Central Europe. I would strongly recommend his selection.”61 The 
Hungárián Committee of the League agreed on the choice of Harding. 
However, he signaled early in March that due to his State of health he 
would nőt be able to accept the post.62
On the eve of the Protocols being ratified by the final signatory 
countries, the Hungárián reconstruction plán was in danger of
60 Mária Ormos, Az 1924. évi magyar államkölcsön megszerzése [Raising the Hungárián 
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dangerously slowing down. Without a Commissioner-General there was 
no prospect of efficient work getting done in Hungary, and raising the 
long-term loan would be unimaginable. The League had to find a suitable 
person in the shortest time possible. Norman Davies and Owen Young 
recommended without hesitation Boyden as best, Jeremiah Smith, Jr. as 
second best fór the job, and Walker Dower Hines as a third possibility.63 
Harding warmly recommended, if Boyden could nőt be secured, an old 
colleague of his, Frederick Adrián Delano, who was Vice-Governor of the 
Federal Reserve Board from 1914-1918, had worked in Europe, and 
spoke French.64 The chances that Boyden would accept were nőt great. 
He had the stinging memory of what had happened a year and a half 
earlier, when he was virtually assured of the Austrian Commissioner- 
General position only to lose it at the last moment. Besides, his wife was 
very sick, which would have made it doubly difficult fór him to accept 
it.65 At the March 15 meeting of the Hungárián Committee the body 
decided that an official invitation would be sent to Boyden, and if he 
refused, the next possible candidates, Smith, Hines, and Delano would be 
approached.66
As was expected, Roland Boyden did indeed refuse the position. 
What was important, however, was that he recommended Smith fór the 
job.67 Evén more momentous than Boyden’s recommendation was when 
Drummond informed the Hungárián Committee that the “highest financial 
circles [in] America strongly take [the] same view.”68 This was 
significant, because as the case of the possible loan stood, it was “clearly 
of greatest importance obtaining [a] person acceptable [to] Financial 
circles best qualified.”69 Since the League expected that a third of the loan 
would be subscribed in the United States, they needed someone fór the 
post that enjoyed the favor of the American Financial circles. If they had 
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the one that promised an easier and more bountiful American participation. 
Both the British Foreign Office and the Treasury were of the opinion that 
the main point was that the person should be an American Citizen. By 
April it was clear that Smith’s backing had grown irresistible. In addition to 
Boyden and Davis, both Pierre Jay of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York and Thomas Lamont of J. P. Morgan & Co. had stood behind him, 
with the latter three “definitely adverse to Delano.” In all probability, it 
was Lamont’s opinion that made all the difference. As he wrote to Salter 
confidentially, “quite aside from personal liking fór the two mén last 
mentioned (Mr. Hines and Mr. Delano) [I] would regard neither one as 
fully equipped fór the job; Smith would be better than either.” Lamont 
was the person that arranged the American part of the Austrian loan, so it 
was understandable that the League had a sensitive ear to his 
recommendation. Suddenly, an upstart Yankee was shoved intő the 
limelight with a mountainous task awaiting him.
Jeremiah Smith, Jr., after being educated at Exeter and Harvard, 
together with Thomas Lamont, served as secretary to Justice Gray of the 
United States Supreme Court in 1895-96, and thereafter he practiced law 
in Boston. He often dealt with local bankruptcies and was known as a 
person who “has held important receiverships and is prominently 
identified with large corporate interests.” He was appointed as member 
of the War Relief Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation in June 
1915 and visited a few European countries in this capacity. During the 
First World War, when he served with the American Expeditionary 
Forces, thanks to Lamont, Smith was awarded a captain’s commission as 
captain in the Quartermaster’s Corps. From this point on, Jeremiah 
Smith’s intemational career began. Upon the Morgan heavyweight’s 
request, Smith took part at the Paris Peace Conference as a counselor to 
the Treasury Department representatives and Financial advisers to the 
American Commission. He was largely disappointed with the final treaty 
and thought it a mistake to sign it.70 12*45 After the Paris Peace Conference, 
Smith accompanied Lamont to Japan and China as an aide of his, and
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later to Mexico in the capacity of counselor again in the Mexican debt 
settlement.76 789Thanks to Lamont’s unwavering help, Smith had gained 
immense experience in international negotiations pertaining to Financial 
questions and problems. The international expertise Smith could boast of 
was a key aspect in accepting him, bút naturally Lamont’s 
recommendation was the decisive factor.
The League officially invited Jeremiah Smith, Jr. to become 
Commissioner-General to Hungary until June 1926 with an $18,000 a 
year salary. In light of the dragged out process in securing a 
Commissioner-General, they asked him to give an answer as soon as 
possible. In what Montagu Norman, who during these weeks looked at the 
success of the Hungárián loan with doubt, described as “a moment of 
enthusiasm,” Smith, with the consent of the State Department, accepted 
the offer. As a Democrat, he supported President’s Wilson’s dream, and 
all through his life he was an advocate of the League of Nations. In all 
likelihood, the job in Hungary offered Smith the chance to become an 
earnest participant in that organization. His affirmative answer alsó lifted 
another burden off the League officials’ shoulders and they were more
79than happy to announce the official appointment.
Smith as Commissioner-General to Hungary fór the League of 
Nations was provided with frequent powers. These were spelled out in 
detail in Article VI. of Protocol No. II. It is indicative of the importance 
of the post that this article was the longest in the two Protocols. The main 
points were as follows: supervising the reconstruction program; all 
information requested by him to be provided by the Hungárián 
government; he could in case of the program being in danger, “require the 
Hungárián Government to increase the yield of existing taxation or to 
impose new taxes;” only with his consent was the government allowed to 
take up new loans; he would reside in Budapest and would provide the 
Council with monthly reports on the reconstruction program; and, most
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importantly from the government’s point of view, “the functions of the 
Commissioner-General shall be brought to an end by a decision of the 
Council of the League of Nations when the Council shall have ascertained 
that the financial stability of Hungary is assured.” In addition, he was to 
have a totál authority over the special account intő which the yield of the 
securities was paid, and over any amount payable on annuity of the 
loan. In light of the tight supervision that Smith would be entitled to in 
Hungary, it was evident that Hungarians were somewhat afraid lest they 
should get a dictator similar to what the Viennese people got in the person 
of Zimmerman. On the other hand, Smith’s nationality provided the hasis 
fór hope as well.
Smith arrived in Hungary on May 1, 1924. His deputy was another
American, Royall Tyler, who was desired to be on the staff from early on82because he “would be invaluable.” Aside from his financial 
qualifications and being an American, Tyler spoke five languages and 
could translate fór Smith in daily conferences. Smith was alsó assisted by 
Harry Siepmann from Great Britain, René Charron from Francé, and by 
Licen from Belgium.
The mood in Hungary had become calmer with Smith’s arrival. 
Brentano reported that Smith had seemingly won “the generál admiration 
of the Hungárián Government and people, due especially to his assiduity, 
modesty and courtesy.” With the Commissioner-General nominated and 
staying in the country, the most arduous phase of the scheme had begun: 
the 250-million-loan fór the Hungárián reconstruction scheme to begin.
In raising the loan, London was to be the main actor, bút the active 
participation of the United States was expected as well. Naturally, it was a
84big disappointment when in mid-May J. P. Morgan & Co. withdrew. 
Lamont informed Smith that the Dutch and Czechoslovak issues had been 
poor and the American public was nőt ready fór a new bond issue. To be 
sure, J. P. Morgan & Co. was already busy laying the groundwork fór the 80*2345
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big prize, the Germán loan in the upcoming fali.86 *89The Commissioner- 
General was understandably disappointed. He knew that the public in 
Hungary looked at him as somewhat of a Messiah, who would bring the 
Promised Land—in the form of American money. Despite this fiasco to 
the contrary, he faced the future with optimism and had “no regrets at87having undertaken this work.”
With J.P. Morgan out, Norman took over and made an exceptional 
agreement with the new Hungárián National Bank, and provided most of 
the missing money. Finally, another American house, Speyer & Co. 
undertook to float $7,500,000 of the loan, so at least somé American 
participation was realized. The subscription started in London by Baring 
Brothers & Co., Rothschild and Són, and J. Henry Schroder & Co. on 
July 2, 1924, and the very next day in New York by the consortium led by 
Speyer & Co. After so much worry, the news was more than welcome that 
in the two most important places the loan was a huge success. In London,
where more than half of the totál amount was floated, lists had to be closed
88before noon, and the sum offered was over-subscribed many times over.
In New York, the subscription was a similar success. Brentano, the 
American Minister in Hungary, attributed the oversubscription to 
American sympathy to and belief in Hungary. Speyer sent the reassuring 
cable that the whole block was subscribed and the lists were closed.90 
Naturally, Smith was “very much pleased that there was an American 
participation.”91 92 So was Bethlen, who confidently stated: “Now the 
American bankers have alsó decided that Hungary is a good, safe 
investment.” In the course of the next week, the Dutch, the Swedish, 
and the Italian tranches scored great successes as well. With the issue of 
the Czech tranche in August, the whole loan issue was done. Speyer 
personally came to Budapest in mid-August and negotiated to take over
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$1.5 millión from the Hungárián tranche, 80% of the totál domesticallv 
raised amount, making the American part now $9 millión in totál. Now 
the money had been raised and Hungary started down the road of a 
hopeful financial reconstruction.
The Hungárián reconstruction was an even bigger success than the 
Austrian one. Only about one fourth of the loan had to be used fór 
deficits. Inflation was halted in July, the budget deficit disappeared within 
a few months and remained stable, and the same was true fór the 
Hungárián crown. Since revenues comfortably covered expenditures, in 
1925 the League authorized $50 millión to be used from the loan fór 
productive investments. At the termination of the Commissioner-General 
on June 30, 1926, all of Hungary celebrated Smith. When the Hungárián 
Prime Minister wanted to give a high decoration in honor of Smith, the 
American was appalled and replied: “If you do, then I shall never forgive 
you. Your friendship and gratitude are more precious to me than any 
decoration.”93 4 The fact that he refused to accept his salary fór the pást two 
years made him a hero both in Hungary and the United States. The 
Hungárián govemment decided to set up a Jeremiah Smith Scholarship 
Fund, which was to send two Hungárián students fór an academic year to 
the United States every year. With the departure of Smith, the successful 
financial reconstruction of Hungary came to a close.
Afterword
It must be said that the American role in European reconstruction 
was both negligible and crucially important. On the political level, the US 
govemment did nőt want to commit itself to the Central European 
reconstruction, or any other reconstruction, fór that matter, savé the 
Germán one. The United States wanted to avoid any step that might have 
bőm on the question of reparations and inter-allied debts connected to it. 
On the financial front, the United States provided a small portion of the 
Austrian and the Hungárián reconstructions, less than one fifth of the totál 
in both. Still, the psychological effect of the participation of American 
priváté Capital was invaluable fór both programs. It showed that there was 
confidence fór this region overseas and it was worth investing money in
93
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these countries. The floodgates were open and huge amounts of American 
Capital started to come.
On another level, although it failed in the case of Austria, the 
League of Nations managed to secure an American fór the post of 
Commissioner-General in Hungary. Their choice of Jeremiah Smith, Jr. 
proved to be a winning one. Evén if as a League official, Smith inevitably 
represented the United States in Central Europe. Aside from professional 
qualifications, the humán dimension that Smith brought with him was 
invaluable. Hungarians, politicians, and everyday people all lóvéd him 
and held him as a savior of Hungary. His popularity stood in sharp 
contrast with that of Alfréd Zimmerman in Austria.
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